Swallows Holding as It Is: The Distortion of National Muffler by Johnson, Steve R.
Florida State University College of Law
Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Publications
7-24-2006
Swallows Holding as It Is: The Distortion of
National Muffler
Steve R. Johnson
Florida State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Publications by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steve R. Johnson, Swallows Holding as It Is: The Distortion of National Muffler Tax Notes 351 (2006),
Available at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/265
    
• 
• 
• 
special report 
Swallows Holding as It Is: 
The Distortion of National Muffler 
By Steve R. Johnson 
Steve R. Johnson is the E.L. Wiegand professor, 
William S. Boyd School of Law, at the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas. The author invites comments at 
steve.johnson@unlv.edu. 
In Swallows Holding Ltd. v. Com1nissioner, a reviewed 
opinion in early 2006, the Tax Court invalidated a 
regulation involving return filing by certain foreign 
corporations. The case is now on appeal to the Third 
Circuit. Johnson believes that the Tax Court's decision 
is wrong because it misread the precedents on which it 
relied and misperceived the roles of Treasury and the 
courts in filling gaps Congress left in tax statutes. 
In this article, Johnson maintains that the Tax Court 
misapplied the standard on which it relied: the Na-
tional Muffier line of cases on deference to tax rules and 
regulations. In a planned future article, Johnson will 
maintain that the Tax Court failed to appreciate the 
teaching of the Supreme Court in the Chevron and 
Brand X cases. According to Johnson, either on Na-
tional Muffler grounds or on Chevron and Brand X 
grounds, the' Swallows Holding decision should be 
reversed. 
The author thanks Bryan Camp and Annette Mann 
for their assistance. 
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I like big ideas. The opportunity to work with them, 
and hopefully to add to them, is one of the joys of 
academic life. But perspective also is required. Not 
everything genuinely presents "macro" issues. 1 As Freud 
supposedly said, "Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar." 
In Swallows Holding Ltd. v. Commissioner,2 the Tax 
Court, over three dissenting opinions, invalidated a 
return-filing timing rule in a Treasury regulation under 
section 882 of the !RC. It is clear that what drove the 
majority opinion was the perception that the timing rule 
was contrary to many previous cases interpreting the 
statute. 3 As I read the majority and dissenting opinions, 
the prospect of writing about great issues danced in my 
head: matters such as (1) the relationship between Chev-
ron" and competing standards of deference,5 and (2) the 
significance for tax law of the Supreme Court's Brand X 
decision,6 dealing with when administrative rules may 
displace prior case law. 
However, when I read the cases on which the Swallows 
majority relied, the need for a "plan B" became apparent. 
1 As the Supreme Court has warned in the context of statu-
tory interpretation, one should avoid the temptation to find 
"elephants in mouseholes." V\Thitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 
Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
2126 TC. 96, Doc 2006-1541, 2006TNT18-10 (2006). On July 5, 
2006, the IRS filed its notice of appeal in this case to the Third 
Circuit. 
3See id. at 137 (denouncing Treasury's promulgating the 
regulation "with total disregard to firmly established judicial 
precedent") and 148 (objecting to Treasury's "attempts to cir-
cumvent longstanding judicial decisions"). 
-!Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
5Judge Mark V. Holmes was thinking along those lines, too. 
His dissent offered the hope that the case may "be a good 
vehicle for appellate guidance on whether National Muffler 
continues to be in good working order after Chevron, Mead, and 
Brand X." Id. at 163-164. 
6 National Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 
125 s. Ct. 2688 (2005). 
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When those cases are carefully analyzed, the perceived 
tension benveen them and the regulation disappears. 
Indeed, understood in the context of the proper roles of 
the courts and Treasury, the cases actually support the 
validity of the regulation. As a re,ult, Swallows does not 
present the "regulation versus case law" conflict that 
would sharpen Brand X and Chevron issues. Yet Swallows 
remains an interesting and important case,7 particularly 
because, in my opinion, the Swallows majority distorted 
the National Muffler' standard, converting it from a shield 
of deference to a sword of invalidation. 
Accordingly, I will write two Swallows reports. This 
report, the first, treats the decision as it is. It explains why, 
given the compatibility of the regulation and the prior 
cases, S1Dallou1s was wrongly decided and should be 
reversed. This article also attempts to bring National 
Muffler back from the diversion it was taken on by 
Sumllows. A future article will treat Swallows not as it is 
but as the Tax Court majority viewed it. That is, the 
second article will assume that the regulation is inconsis-
tent with the prior cases. That assumption will allow 
exploration of Chevron and Brand X issues. 
This article has five main parts. Part I describes 
Szva1Iou1s. The case for reversal of Swallows rests on 
propositions which are developed in Parts II, IJI, IV, and 
V. Part II shows that, properly understood, the previous 
cases held that some timing requirement for the filing of 
returns is implicit in the governing statute. Therefore, the 
only questidn is one of line-drawing: where to draw the 
line between permissibly tardy returns and impermissi-
bly tardy returns. 
Part IJI notes that Congress did not instruct where the 
timing line was to be drawn. It left a gap to be filled. 
Line-drawing under an implicit delegation is a matter for 
Treasury and the IRS, not for the courts. Part IV demon-
strates that the line drawn by the regulation is reason-
able. It effectively furthers the purpose behind the stat-
ute; it responds to a genuine need in the orderly 
administration of the tax laws; and it is indulgent toward, 
not burdensome for, taxpayers. All that being so, the 
regulation at issue should be upheld. 
Part V particularizes the analysis under National Muf-
fler and the other cases of its line. Part V establishes that, 
7Commentary about Swallows thus far includes Jasper L. 
Cummings, Jr., "Tax Court Decision Demonstrates Uncertainty 
in Standard of Review for Interpretive Versus Legislative Regu-
lations," 25 Tax Man. Weekly Rep. 585 (2006); Craig W. Friedrich, 
''Late Filing Foreign Corporation Does Not Forfeit Deductions; 
Contrary Regulation Invalidated," Corp. Tax'n, May /June 2006, 
at 44; Richard M. Lipton, "A Divided Tax Court Rejects a 
Regulation - and Struggles With Administrative Law - in 
Swallows Holding," 104 J. Tax'n 260 (2006); Kathryn). Morrison, 
"Are Timely Filed Returns a Prerequisite for Foreign Corpora-
tion Expense Deductions?" ABA Section of Taxation NewsQuar-
terly, Summer 2006, at 9; W. Eugene Seago and Edward J. 
Schnee, "The Tax Court Salvages a Foreign Corporation's De-
ductions in Swallows Holding," Corp. Tax'n, May /June 2006, at 
20; Lee A. Sheppard, "Tax Court Flunks the Brand X Test," Tax 
Notes, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 585. 
8National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 
(1979). 
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although that line of cases is deferential toward tax 
regulations, the approach of the Swallows majority was 
closer to a hard look than to deference. When National 
Muffler is properly applied deferentially, upholding the 
regulation should not be problematic. 
I. Swallows 
A. Facts 
The taxpayer was a foreign corporation that owned 
real property in the United States. The corporation was 
on a fiscal year ending on May 31. The tax years at issue 
were 1994, 1995, and 1996. The due dates for those 
returns were November 15 of 1994, 1995, and 1996, 
respectively.9 The corporation did not file those returns 
until July 23, 1999. However, the corporation had not 
been contacted by the IRS about the delinquent returns, 
nor had the IRS prepared substitutes for those returns. 
The corporation was treated as having elected to treat its 
U.S.-source income as effectively connected with a U.S. 
trade or business.10 The corporation's deductions for the 
years at issue substantially exceeded its income. The IRS 
disallowed the claimed deductions and asserted deficien-
cies. The corporation filed a Tax Court petition. 
Section 882(c)(2) provides that a foreign corporation 
with effectively connected income can claim deductions 
"only by filing ... a true and accurate return, in the 
manner prescribed in subtitle F, including therein all the 
information which the [IRS] may deem necessary for the 
calculation of such deductions." That requirement en-
tered the law in 1928 and has been reenacted many times 
without essential change.11 Subtitle F contains the proce-
dural sections of the code, including section 6072, which 
prescribes when income tax returns are to be filed. 
Regulations were promulgated in 1957, nearly 30 
years after enactment of the original predecessor of 
section 882. The regulations were amended in 1990 and 
again in 2002 and 2003.12 The timing rule at issue in 
Swallows emanated from the 1990 amendments. Those 
amendments were first proposed in July 198913 and were 
finalized in December 1990, effective for tax years ending 
after July 31, 1990.14 Before being finalized, the amend-
ments went through the familiar notice-and-comment 
process.15 
The 1990 amendments set out timing rules for foreign 
corporations in reg. section 1.882-4 and broadly similar 
9Usually, a corporation must file its income tax return by the 
15th day of the third month after the close of its tax year. Section 
6072(b); reg. section 1.6072-(a). However, foreign corporations 
without an office or place of business in the United States (such 
as the Swallozvs taxpayer) may file up to the 15th day of the sixth 
month after the close of the year. Section 6072(c); reg. section 
l.6072-2(b). 
10126 T.C. at 97; see section 882(d)(l). 
11The statutory history is recounted at 126 T.C. at 107-111. 
12The regulatory history is recounted in id. at 125-129. 
1354 Fed. Reg. 31545 (July 31, 1989). 
14T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172, 55 Fed. Reg. 50827-01 (Dec. 11, 
1990), corrected at 56 Fed. Reg. 1361-01 (Jan. 14, 1991) and 56 Fed. 
Reg. 5455-07 (Feb. 11, 1991). 
15See proc. reg. section 601.601; 1Rlv1 30(15) and 32.1.5. 
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timing rules for nonresident alien individuals in reg. 
section 1.874-1. Under the amended regulation, a foreign 
corporation may avail itself of otherwise allowable de-
ductions and credits for the year only if it files its federal 
income tax return by a specified time. 16 
The rules defining the specified date or terminal date 
include complexities and special rules unnecessary to 
explore for Swallows purposes. 17 In general, and as appli-
cable to the Swallows taxpayer, for the corporation to be 
allowed deductions, "the required return for the current 
taxable year must be filed within 18 months of the due 
date as set forth in section 6072 and the regulations under 
that section, for filing the return for the current taxable 
year."" For simplicity, I use the 18-month terminal date 
throughout this article. It was the failure of the Swallows 
taxpayer to file its 1994, 1995, and 1996 returns within the 
18-month period that prompted the IRS to disallow the 
deductions claimed for those years. 
Finally, as relevant here, the 1990 regulation allows the 
IRS to waive the 18-month requirement for good cause, 
based on the facts and circumstances, if shown by the 
foreign corporation.19 It does not appear that the Swallows 
taxpayer sought this waiver. 
The taxpayer challenged the validity of the regulation, 
leading to review by the full Tax Court. 20 The majority 
opinion, invalidating the 18-month time limit in the 
regulation, was authored by Judge David Laro, with 12 
judges joining in the opinion and 2 judges concurring in 
the result only. judges Stephen). Swift, James S. Halpern, 
and Mark V. Holmes wrote dissenting op~ions . 
B. Majority Opinion 
Because the regulation in question was promulgated 
under the g~neral authority of section 7805(a) and not 
under specifi'c authority in section 882 itself, the regula-
tion is an interpretive regulation. At least in theory, 
interpretive regulations receive less deference than legis-
lative regulations. 21 The Swallows majority identified Na-
tional Muffler as the standard by which to assess the 
16Reg. section l.882-4(a)(2). 
17For a full statement of the rules, see re_g. section l.882-
4(a)(3); see also 126 T.C. at 135 n.17 (majority opinion) and 
151-153 (Swift, )., dissenting). 
18Reg. section l.882-4(a)(3)(i). If no return has been filed for 
the year immediately preceding the current year, the terminal 
date is 18 months after the due date of the current year's return 
or the date the IRS "mails a notice to the foreign corporation 
advising the corporation that the current year tax return has not 
been filed and that no deductions ... may be claimed by the 
taxr,ayer." Id. 
9Reg. section l.882-4(a)(3)(ii). 
2
°For description of the Tax Court's conference and review 
procedures, see Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An 
, Historical Analysis 352-360 (1979). Invalidation of a treasury 
regulation is one of the situations that customarily triggers 
full-court review by the Tax Court. 
21 See, e.g., Rowan Cos., [nc. v. Con1missioner, 452 U.S. 247, 253 
(1981). I say "in theory" because it is unclear that this difference 
operates in fact, not just in rhetoric. This point will be explored 
in the second article. 
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validity of interpretive tax regulations. 22 In general, a 
regulation is valid under that standard if it implements 
Congress's intention in a reasonable manner, that is, if it 
"harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its 
origin, and its purpose."23 
The majority focused on six factors drawn from Na-
tional Muffler: whether the regulation was substantially 
contemporaneous with the statute, the manner in which 
the regulation evolved, whether the regulation is of long 
standing, reliance placed on the regulation, the consis-
tency of the IRS's interpretation, and how much scrutiny 
Congress gave the regulation during subsequent reenact-
ments. 24 
The majority concluded that the regulation failed 
under those factors. For this article's purposes, two 
aspects of the majority's analysis are particularly note-
worthy: (1) the majority's "plain language" argument 
based on prior cases construing the statute, and (2) the 
majority's "legislative reenactment" argument. 
First, the majority stated: "A plain reading of the 
relevant text [of section 882(c)(2)] in the context of 
the ... Code shows that the text includes no timely filing 
requirement."25 The statute does make filing a return "in 
the manner prescribed by Subtitle F" a condition for 
allowance of deductions. However, the majority held that 
the "plain meaning of the word 'manner,' as used in the 
relevant text, does not include an element of time."26 
Thus, when the regulation added a timing rule as to 
returns, it impermissibly went beyond the statute. 
Central to the majority's "plain meaning" argument 
were the prior cases involving section 882(c)(2), substan-
tially similar section 874(a),27 and their predecessors. The 
first case of this line was the Board of Tax Appeals' 
(BTA's) 1938 Anglo-American decision.28 The line included 
eight other cases that were decided betwaen 1939 and 
1996." The Swallows majority believed the regulation to 
22126 T.C. at 129-131. The majority added, however, that the 
result it reached would have been the same had it applied 
Chevron instead of National Muffl.er. ld. at 131. 
23440 U.S. at 476-477. 
24126 T.C. at 136-137 (citing 440 U.S. at 477). 
25126 T.C. at 132. 
26/d. 
27[n relevant respects, the section 874 rules as to nonresident 
alien individuals parallel the section 884 rules concerning 
foreign corporations, including conditioning deductions on 
properly filed returns. Accordingly, the two sections are viewL·d 
as in pari materia. E.g., id. at 112; Espinosa v. Commissioner, ! 07 
TC. 146, 153, Doc 96-26161, 96 TNT 188-4 (1996). 
28 Anglo-Am. Direct Tea Trading Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, J.S 
B.T.A. 711 (1938). The IRS issued a nonacquiescence to A11gfo-
American. 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 1) 39. 
29The cases are Mills, Spence & Co. v. Commissioner, 1938 VVl. 
8403 (B.T.A. memo. 1938); American Inv. & Gen. Trust L"-i Co. t'. 
Contmissioner, 1939 WL 12004 (B.T.A. memo. 1939); Taylor SeL'., 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 696 (1939); Ardbern Co. r1. Co111111i . ..; 
sioner, 120 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1941), modift;ing and re1111111di11g 011 
other grounds, 41 B.T.A. 910 (1940); Blenheim Co. v. Co111111i::.::;io11('r, 
125 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1942), affg 42 BT.A 1248 (1940); c,·"1·,/,111 
Enter. v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1942), i~tf'x ! 9-Hl \VI 
10265 (B.T.A. memo. 1940); Espinosa v. Con1n1issio11er, 107 re. l-~(1 
(1996); [nverWorld, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. !996-:'ltl I. 71 
(Footnote continued on next p.1ge.l 
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be inconsistent with those cases, although it did not 
explain the perceived inconsistency with particularity. I 
read the prior cases differently, as will be seen in Part IL 
The other noteworthy aspect of the majority opinion is 
its invocation of the legislative, reenactment doctrine. 
Citing cases, the majority summarized the doctrine 
thusly: "Congress is presumed to have known of the 
administrative and judicial interpretations of a statutory 
term reenacted without significant change and to have 
ratified and included that interpretation in the reenacted 
terrn."3° Congress had reenacted, without essential 
change, section 882 and its predecessors several times 
after Anglo-American was decided. On that basis, the 
majority concluded that Congress approved of that case 
and the cases that came after it. 
C Dissenting Opinions 
I will recount only the portions of the dissents relevant 
to this article. Judge Swift thought the prior cases were 
distinguishable because the 1990 regulation was not at 
play in them.31 Thus, "the majority opinion fails to 
properly distinguish the pre-1990 'no-regulation environ-
ment' of the cited court opinions from the environment 
or authority that came into existence upon promulgation 
[of the regulation] in 1990."32 
Judge Holmes challenged the majority's conclusion 
that the statute has an unambiguous meaning that ex-
cludes timing. He gave examples in both tax and contract 
law in wl)ich the term "manner" has been seen as 
including timing.33 
Also, three points were common to two or all three of 
the dissents. First, all three dissenters thought that the 
majority misread the earlier cases. They concluded that 
later cases modified Anglo-American and permit a timing 
rule.34 That point is developed in Part II below. 
Second, Judges Halpern and Holmes concluded that 
Chevron, not National Muffler, should provide the control-
ling standard and that the regulation is valid under 
Chevron. 35 
Third, Judges Holmes and Swift criticized the majori-
ty's legislative reenactment analysis. Judge Holmes pro-
nounced himself "quite leery of the majority's formula-
tion" of the doctrine, particularly "when it is used to 
invalidate, rather than uphold, a regulation."36 The major-
ity had added its formulation "for sake of complete-
T.C.M. (CCH) 3231, Doc 96-18802, 96 TNT 127-14. The cases are 
discussed at 126 T.C. at 112-125. 
30126 T.C. at 139-142. 31Most of the cases involved years before 1990. The regula-
tion was in existence for some of the years at issue in Espinosa 
and InverWorld. However, the Tax Court resolved those cases on 
the basis of precedent, obviating the need to assess the validity 
of the regulation. Espinosa, supra note 27, at 158; InverWorld, 
supra note 29, at 3237-3255. 
32126 T.C. at 149. 33ld. at 165-166. The tax examples are reg. section l.179-5(a) 
implementing section 179(c) and reg. section 1.826-l(c) imple-
menting section 835(c)(2). 
34126 T.C. at 150-151 Qudge Swift), 158-160 (Judge Halpern), 
and 167-168 (Judge Holmes). 
35/d. at 157-162 (Judge Halpern) and 172-182 (judge Holmes). 36Jd. at 169 (emphasis in original). 
354 
ness,"37 but the majority's formulation was itself incom-
plete. The legislative reenactment doctrine does not 
apply "where nothing indicates that the legislature had 
its attention directed to the administrative interpretation 
upon reenactment."38 There are cases that invoke the 
doctrine without establishing this predicate condition. 
Nonetheless, the better view is that the doctrine either, 
doesn't apply or carries little weight, absent legislative 
awareness of the interpretation.39 Thus, "the majority's 
reliance on legislative reenactment should have ended 
when it could find no affirmative evidence that Congress 
knew of any of the [cases] which the majority had 
invoked."40 
Judge Swift also noted that the Tax Court had previ-
ously stated, "We do not believe that the legislative 
reenactment doctrine can be applied to bar reasonable 
amendments to regulations where ... the change is made 
only prospectively from the date of the announcement of 
the proposed~ change."41 The 1990 regulation was pro-
spective in that regard. 
II. Prior Cases Support Some Timing Requirement 
The Swallows majority misread the case law on which 
it relied. Three tribunals - the BIA, the Tax Court, and 
the Fourth Circuit42 - decided the nine prior cases. At 
the end of the day, all three of those tribunals - far from 
rejecting timing as a component of section 882 - agreed 
that some timing aspect is implicit in the .statute. 
The prior cases divide into two groups·: the first three 
decisions and the later six decisions. As shown below, the 
first group sent mixed signals and need not be read as 
flatly prohjbiting any timing requirement. Even if the 
first group were so read, however, the second group 
effectively overruled that position and clearly embraced 
the notion that some timing limitation is consistent with 
the statute. 
A. First Three Decisions 
The BIA first considered the issue in the Anglo-
American case in 1938.43 The foreign corporation did not 
37Jd. at 139. 
38/d. at 155 (Judge Swift) (quoting 2B Norman J. Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction section 49:09 (6th ed. (2000)). 
39See, e.g., William D. Popkin, Materials on Legislation: Political 
Lanfcuage and the Political Process 632 (4th ed. 2005). 
0126 T.C. at 170 Oudge Holmes). 41 Id. at 156 (quoting Wendland v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 355, 384 
(1982), aft d sub nom., Redhouse v. Commissioner, 728 F.2d 1249 (9th 
Cir. 1984)). 
42For foreign corporations without a principal place of 
business or principal office or agency in any U.S. judicial 
district, venue for appeal of a Tax Court decision is determined 
by reference to the IRS office where the corporation's returns are 
filed. Section 7482(b)(l)(B). For the years involved in the early 
cases, foreign corporations filed their returns with the collector 
of internal revenue in Baltimore, which is why the Fourth 
Circuit was the appellate court in those cases. For the years at 
issue in Swallaws, foreign corporations filed their returns with 
the IRS campus in Philadelphia, which is why Swallows is on 
appeal to the Third Circuit. See 126 T.C. at 105-106 and n.9. 43 Anglo-Am. Direct Tea Trading Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 38 
B.T.A. 711 (1938). 
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timely file returns for its 1932 and 1933 tax years. The IRS 
discussed the matter with a corporate officer in March 
1935. In April 1935, without informing the corporation, 
an IRS agent prepared substitutes for returns (SFRs). 44 
Before the commissioner had accepted the SFRs, the 
taxpayer filed its delinquent returns. Under the prede-
cessor of current section 882, the IRS denied the deduc-
tions claimed on those returns because the returns were 
delinquent. The IRS's position appears to have been that 
returns filed even one day after the due date precluded 
claiming deductions. 45 
The BTA, in a reviewed decision and without dissent, 
rejected the IRS's position. The board defined "manner," 
which appeared in the statute then the same way as it 
does now. The board acknowledged linguistic ambiguity. 
It is true, as [the IRS] points out, that "manner" is a 
comprehensive term, and includes, but is more 
comprehensive than, "method, mode, or way." But 
whether it is broad enough to include the element 
of time is a more difficult question. In some in-
stances it has been construed by courts as including 
time; while in others it has been construed as not 
including it.46 
Nonetheless, employing a "clear statement" ap-
proach," the BTA concluded that in the context of the 
statute, "manner" did not include a time element. "If 
Congress had intended to deprive a foreign corporation 
of its right to deduct[ions] if it did not file its return 
within the time prescribed, we think it would have said 
so."48 
However, the BTA stated its holding thus)y: "We hold, 
therefore, that the mere fact that the return was not filed 
within the time prescribed by [what is now code section 
6072} does not, under the circumstances present here, 
preclude the ~llowance of the deductions claimed."49 The 
44There are two types of SFRs. One type is prepared by the 
IRS from available information but is presented to, and is signed 
by, the taxpayer. Section 6020(a). The other type is prepared by 
the IRS but not signed by the taxpayer. Section 6020(b). The 
SFRs discussed in this article are of the second type. For 
discussion of some of the issues raised by SFRs, see Bryan T. 
Camp, "The Function of Forms in the Substitute-for-Return 
Process," Tax Notes, June 26, 2006, p. 1511. 
45See 38 B.T.A. at 713-714. 
46Id. at 714 (numerous cited cases omitted). 
471£ a court dislikes a particular substantive result, a common 
device is to declare something like "we will attribute to Con.-
gress an intention to produce that result only if the statute 
contains a clear statement of that intention" and then to hold 
that such a clear statement is absent from the statute. See 
generally William V. Luneburg,- "Justice Rehnquist, Statutory 
Interpretation, the Policies of Clear Statement, and Federal 
Jurisdiction," 58 Ind. L.J. 211 (1982). For a recent Supreme Court 
case making double use of the "clear statement" approach, see 
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2224 (2006) (plurality 
, opinion). 
4838 B.T.A. at 715. A later Tax Court case implicitly rejected 
this rationale and held that this draconian deprivation is in-
tended to have an in terrorem effect furthering Congress's 
purpose of encouraging foreign corporations to file returns. 
Espinosa v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 146, 152, 157 (1996). 
'°38 B.T.A. at 715. 
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wording "under the circumstances present here" holds 
out the possibility of a different result on different facts. 
Moreover, the holding rejects only a time cutoff fixed at 
the due date for the filing of the return. It does not reject 
all possible more lenient cutoffs, such as the 18-month 
period under the 1990 regulation.so By virtue of its 
holding, therefore, Anglo-American need not stand for the 
absolute proposition that no timing requirement whatso-
ever is permissible under what is now section 882(c)(2). 
Anglo-American was followed in short order by two 
BTA memorandum decisions: Mills and American Invest-
ment.51 In their essential facts, those cases resembled 
Anglo-American, and the BTA resolved the cases in the 
taxpayers' favor, citing Anglo-American but providing no 
further analysis. 
B. Six Subsequent Decisions 
The three early decisions did not end the BTA' s 
consideration of the issue. Slightly over a year after 
Anglo-American, the BTA decided Taylor Securities. The 
foreign corporation had not filed returns for tax years 
1930 through 1935. In March 1937 the IRS issued a notice 
of deficiency for the years based on SFRs. In June 1937 the 
corporation filed a petition with the BTA. The IRS timely 
answered. Hearing was set for December 5, 1938, but was 
continued until January 16, 1939. The taxpayer filed the 
delinquent returns on December 13, 1938. 
The board distinguished Anglo-American because in 
that case the returns had been filed before the deficiency 
notice was issued, the returns had been audited, and the 
commissioner had not accepted the SFRs.52 "Nor did we 
decide there the question raised on argument here 
[which] is whether the [corporation], by filing returns 
after the [commissioner] made his determination of de-
ficiencies," satisfied the statutory condition for allowance 
of the deductions.53 , 
In a reviewed decision (with two members concurring 
on other grounds and three dissenting), the BTA resolved 
this question in favor of the IRS. The board stated that, 
under the statute: 
the allowance to foreign corporations of the credits 
and deductions ordinarily allowable is specifically 
predicated upon such corporations filing returns. In 
view of such a specific prerequisite it is inconceiv-
able that Congress contemplated by that section 
that taxpayers could wait indefinitely to file returns 
50Tue Swallows majority stated that the IRS "acknowledges 
[that its position in Swallows] is the same as that rejected in 
Anglo-Am .... and its progeny." 126 T.C. at 99. If the IRS did 
make that concession, the concession was erroneous. Allowing 
the taxpayer an 18-month grace period after the return due date 
(the regulation) is considerably less burdensome on taxpayers 
than allowing no post-due-date grace period (the IRS's litigating 
position in Anglo-American). In any event, a regulation has 
higher dignity than a litigating position. See ABA Section of 
Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference (here-
after ABA Deference Report), 57 Tax Law. 717, 758-759 (2004). 
51Mills, Spence & Co.,' Ltd. v. Commissioner, 1938 WL 8403 
(B.T.A. memo. 1938); American Inv. & Gen. Trust Co., Ltd. v. 
Commissioner, 1939 WL 12044 (B.T.A. memo. 1939). 
32Taylor Sec. Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 696, 702-703 (1939). 
53ld. at 703. 
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and eventually when the [IRS] determined deficien-
cies against them that they could then by filing 
returns obtain all the benefits to which they would 
have been entitled if their returns had been timely 
filed. Such a construction wo11ld put a premium on 
evasion, since a taxpayer would have nothing to 
lose by not filing a return as required by the 
statute.54 
It is not entirely clear whether the Taylor Securities 
board adopted a fixed moment for when a return would 
be too late, although a possible reading is that a return 
filed after issuance of the notice of deficiency is too late. 
What is clear, however, is that the BTA abandoned in 
Taylor Securities what it may have said in Anglo-American. 
The statute does contain a timing element, after all. At 
some point, a return is filed too late, forfeiting otherwise 
available deductions. 
That teaching of Taylor Securities has remained the law 
ever since, at least until Swallows. All post-Taylor Securities 
cases confirmed that the statute implies some cutoff time. 
The first cases confirming that were Ardbern, Blenheim, 
and Georday, decided by the BTA in 1940 and upheld, on 
the essential point, by the Fourth Circuit. 55 In Ardbern, the 
foreign corporation did not timely file its 1929 through 
1932 returns. The IRS contacted the corporation about the 
missing returns, after which, in June 1937, the corpora-
tion tried to file the returns with an IRS agent. Then, 
however, the law required those returns to be filed with 
the collectOr of internal revenue in Baltimore, -so the agent 
refused to accept the returns. In July 1937 the IRS issued 
a notice of deficiency and prepared SFRs. The corpora-
tion's petition to the BTA was filed in September 1937, 
and the IRS's answer was filed in December 1937. After 
further attempts, the corporation properly filed the re-
turns in October 1938. 
The BTA held for the IRS on the strength of Taylor 
Securities. In a confused opinion, the Fourth Circuit 
modified and remanded but for reasons unique to the 
case. The Fourth Circuit faulted the IRS agent for not 
directing the taxpayer, when it proffered the returns in 
June 1937, to file the returns with the collector in Balti-
more_sn The court continued: 
It is conceded that, if the returns ... had been prop-
erly filed before the Collector at Baltimore, taxpayer 
54Id. at 703-704. The last sentence may be an exaggeration. 
Assuming the existence of an underpayment, the taxpayer 
could have "something to lose": a delinquency penalty imposed 
under what is currently section 6651. Also, failure to file may 
affect the corporation's ability to make some tax elections. 
55 Ardbern Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 910 (1940), 
modified and remanded on other grounds, 120 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 
1941); Blenheim Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1248 (1940), 
affd, 125 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1942); Georday Enter., Ltd. v. Commis-
sioner, 1940 WL 10265 (B.T.A. memo. 1940), affd, 126 F.2d 384 
(4th Cir. 1942). 
56The circuit court acknowledged that "there is no statutory 
authority for the making or filing" of those returns with an IRS 
agent, or indeed with anyone "other than the Collector desig-
nated in the statute, to accept returns." Nonetheless, the court 
continued, "fair dealing between the Government and a tax-
payer would require the agent to whom the returns were 
(Footnote continued in next co)umn.) 
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would have been entitled to the deductions 
claimed ... [The taxpayer should prevail when] he 
shows that prior to ... assessment [of the deficiency] • 
he attempted in good faith to file a return in which 
such deductions were claimed. Titls is nothing but 
· elementary justice, and we find nothing in the statute 
which forbids it." 
The words "prior to ... assessment" seemed to signal 
the Fourth Circuit's agreement that the statute contains a 
timing element, although perhaps a different time (mak-
ing of the assessment) than the BTA may have suggested 
in Taylor Securities (issuance of the notice of deficiency).58 
However, the Fourth Circuit followed the above quota-
tion with a quotation from Anglo-American that suggested 
there is no time element in the statute at all.59 The court 
did not attempt to reconcile those inconsistent strands. 
The Fourth Circuit also buttressed its conclusion by 
invoking the canon that doubt regarding the meaning of 
tax statutes is resolved against the gove~ent and in 
improperly tendered for filing to advise the taxpayer as to the 
official and place where the returns should be filed." 120 F.2d at 
426. 
57Id. I have reservations about the court's reasoning. Fairness • 
alone is not, generally a judicially enforceable aspect of tax law, 
e.g., Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 95-96 (1977), and the 
circuit court did not attempt to fit its conception of "elementary 
justice" into a recognized doctrine such as equitable estoppel. 
However, it is not necessary in this article to explore those 
reservations. See generally Richard J. Wood, "Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence of Tax Fairness," 36 Seton Hall L. Rev. 421 (2006). 
It is possible, but not certain, that the "good cause" exception 
in the 1990 regulation would lead the IRS to waive the 18-month 
limitation were a case like Ardbern to occur now. See 126 T.C. at 
154 (Swift, )., dissenting). 
58However, it is not entirely clear that the Fourth Circuit 
understood "assessment" to differ from "issuance of a notice of 
deficiency." Assessment has a term of art meaning under section 
6203. Generalist judges, however, sometimes use the term 
colloquially, as essentially equivalent to "determination." See, 
e.g., Demirjian v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 1, 2 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972). It 
is unclear from Ardbern whether the circuit court was using 
assessment in its technical sense or its colloquial sense. 
Moreover, even if the Ardbern court meant assessment in its 
technical sense, that position would be inconsistent with most of 
the cases. In general, assessment can't be made until after the 
IRS issues the deficiency notice and after the decision in any 
ensuing Tax Court (or, earlier, B.T.A.) case becomes final. Section 
6213(a). As will be seen from the description of the other 
pre-Swallows cases infra, those cases do not defer the terminal 
date until so late in the process. See, e.g., Espinosa, 107 T.C. at 157 
(rejecting, at least on the facts of that case, the taxpayer's 
argument that the terminal date is not earlier than the date of 
issuance of the deficiency notice). 
59120 F.2d at 426 (quoting 38 B.T.A. at 716: "Inasmuch as 
separate sections deal with 'manner' and 'time,' we think it 
highly improbable that Congress ever intended to include the ,, 
element of time in the section dealing primarily with the ' 
manner of filing."). 
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favor of the taxpayer.60 That canon appeared in many 
cases in the first half of the 20th century but is now 
generally discredited.61 
Any confusion created by Ardbern about the Fourth 
Circuit's view was cleared up by its decision in Blenheim, 
which strongly endorsed Taylor Securities and made no 
mention of Anglo-American. In Blenheim, the foreign cor-
poration filed a personal holding company return (Form 
1120H), but not a regular corporate income tax return 
(Form 1120), for tax year 1934. The IRS asked the corpo-
ration to file a Form 1120, but the corporation declined to 
do so. The IRS prepared an SFR in April 1938 and issued 
a deficiency notice in May 1938. The corporation filed the 
Form 1120 in August 1938. 
The BTA held that the 1120H could not take the place 
of the Form 1120 since the personal holding company tax 
is separate and distinct from the corporate income tax. 62 
The board held for the IRS, citing Taylor Securities for the 
proposition that a taxpayer cannot "take advantage from 
an alleged return submitted by the taxpayer not only 
after the [IRS prepares an SFR] but also after the issuance 
of a notice of deficiency."63 
The board added that Anglo-American "does not aid 
petitioner, since it held only that a return filed before the 
determination of a deficiency was sufficient compli-
ance."64 That reading moves Anglo-American from "tim-
ing isn't part of the statute at all" to "timing is part of the 
statute and determination of the deficiency is the critical 
time demarcation." As noted above, the BTA's Anglo-
American holding is in conflict with its "manner doesn't 
include timing" discussion. The BTA in Blenheim resolved 
the conflict by preferring the holding over the "manner" 
discussion. 
The equitable factor present in Ardbern was not also 
present in Blenheim, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 
First, it held that the statute does contemplate a timing 
element. "It is true that [the statuteJ contains no reference 
to a time element. Nevertheless, we feel that the [Form 
1120 filed in August 1938] was not a sufficient or timely 
compliance with [the statute] to entitle the petitioner to 
the deductions claimed therein."6s 
Second, the Fourth Circuit explained why a timing 
rule is implicit in the statute. The court noted the IRS's 
extended but unsuccessful efforts to induce the corpora-
tion to file voluntarily. The corporation's "inactivity and 
uncooperative attitude" forced the IRS -to prepare an 
SFR.66 
The difficulty here encountered by the Commis-
sioner in attempting to ascertain the petitioner's 
correct income tax is a striking example of the many 
60120 F.2d at 426 (quoting United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 
179 (1923)). 
61See generally Steve R. Jolmson, "Should Ambiguous Rev-
, enue Laws Be Interpreted in Favor of Taxpayers?" Nevada 
La":?£er, April 2002, at 15. 
42 B.T.A. at 1251-1252; see section 541. 
6342 B.T.A. at 1251. 
6
.:.Id. 
65125 F.2d at 908. 
66Id. at 909. 
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administrative problems inherent in the application 
of the federal income tax to foreign corporations. 
This has prompted Congress to impose special 
conditions on such corporations. . . . This situation 
is pregnant with possibilities of tax evasion. In 
express recognition of this fertile danger to the 
orderly administration of the income tax as applied 
to foreign corporations, Congress conditioned its 
grant of deductions upon the timely filing of true, 
proper and complete returns. 67 
The Blenheim court identified the "SFR preparation" 
terminal date as originating from Taylor Securities, but the 
court did not treat that date as invariable. 
Without prescribing an absolute and rigid rule that 
whenever the Commissioner files a return [an SFR] 
for a foreign corporation the taxpayer is completely 
and automatically denied the benefit of deductions 
or credits, we yet hold that the facts of the instant 
case justify a disallowance of deductions which 
petitioner might otherwise have been entitled to 
claim, had it filed a timely return in compliance 
with the statutory requirement. 68 
Georday was a companion case to Blenheim. The return 
was filed more than five years after its due date, and also 
after the SFR, after the deficiency notice, and after the 
BTA petition. The Fourth Circuit denied the claimed 
deductions because the corporation failed to file "within 
the reasonable terminal period prescribed in the Blenheim 
case."69 
A decades-long gap in the litigation ended with two 
1996 Tax Court decisions: Espinosa and InverWorld.'O In 
those cases, the Tax Court joined the BTA and the Fourth 
Circuit in concluding that section 882 includes a time 
element. 
Espinosa involved section 874(a), whicH deals with 
nonresident alien individuals and is in pari materia with 
section 882(c)(2). The nonresident had not filed income 
tax returns for 1987 through 1991 when the IRS contacted 
him in November 1992. In February 1993 the IRS notified 
him that it had prepared SFRs. In March 1993 the IRS sent 
him a "doomsday" letter stating that he could no longer 
claim deductions for the years. In October 1993 the 
nonresident filed his returns for the years 1987 through 
1991. In January 1994 the IRS issued a deficiency notice. 
The court noted that section 874, like section 882, 
contains no time limit "on its face,"71 and it described the 
two sections as "draconian provisions designed to induce 
foreign corporations and nonresident alien individuals to 
file tax returns."72 Based on its rehearsing the cases 
described above, the Tax Court made three observations: 
67Id.; see also id. at 910. In addition to policy, the Blenheim 
court justified its result by perceived congressional intent and 
by reference to regulations under the statute regarding nonresi-
dent alien individuals, which essentially parallels the statute 
regarding foreign corporations. Id. at 909-910. 
68/d. at 910. • 
69126 F.2d at 388 . 
70Espinosa, supra note 27; InverWorld, supra note 2.9. 
71107 T.C. at 150. 
"Id. at 152 (citing Blenheim, 125 F.2d at 909) . 
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(1) "Although section 874(a) contains no express time 
limit, at some point there exists a terminal date, after 
which a taxpayer can no longer claim the benefit of 
deductions by filing a return."73 (2) The terminal date is 
not the return due date established under section 6072." 
(3) Absent "compelling equitable considerations," as in 
Ardbern, "a taxpayer cannot claim the benefit of deduc-
tions by filing a return after the Commissioner has 
prepared a substitute return and issued a notice of 
deficiency.''75 
The rationale for the timing element is "the policy 
behind the provisions. . . . If no cut-off point existed, 
taxpayers would have an indefinite time to file a return, 
and these provisions would be rendered meaning-
less. . . . The prior case law established the terminal 
date ... to ensure that [the sections] would have the in 
tcrrore1n effect that Congress intended."76 
The facts of Espinosa differed from those of some of the 
prior cases. In Espinosa, the returns were filed after the 
IRS prepared the SFRs but before it issued the notice of 
deficiency. The taxpayer argued, first, that the statute 
includes no time element at all and, second, in the 
alternative, that the terminal date should be the date the 
notice of deficiency is issued. The Tax Court rejected both 
of the taxpayer's arguments "where, as here, the Com-
missioner has notified the taxpayer that he has not filed 
a return and has given the taxpayer a reasonable time 
within wf>ich to file a return."" 
Finally, in InverWorld the foreign corporation had not 
filed its returns for the years at issue - not even by the 
date of trial of the case. On the strength of Georday and 
Blenlieim, the Tax Court denied deductions sought by the 
corp oration. 78 
C. Summary 
The preceding discussion shows that, if Anglo-
A1nerican ever stood for a "no timing element" rule, that 
rule was abandoned by the subsequent cases. At the end 
of the day, all three tribunals that had considered the 
question - the BTA,79 the Fourth Circuit, 80 and the Tax 
Court81 - agreed that some timing requirement, some 
terminal date, is implicit in section 882. 
Significantly, even the Swallows majority conceded 
that the prior cases establish that section 882(c)(2) implies 
a timing requirement - although the majority appears 
not to have recognized that it was making that conces-
sion. At first, the majority rejected the existence of this 
requirement, stating: "The disputed regulations were 
issued after both the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
73107 T.C. at 156 (citing Taylor Securities and Blenhein1). 
74Id. (citing Anglo-American). 
75Id. (citing Blenheim and Taylor Securities). 
76Id. at 157. 
77Id. 
7871 T.C.M. at 3237-3256. 
791n Taylor Securities, Ardbem, Blenheim, and Georday. 80In Ardbern (absent unusual circumstances not present in 
Siual/ows), Blenheim, and Georday. 
81 In Espinosa and lnverWorld. 
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Circuit and the Board had repeatedly and consistently 
held that the relevant text did not include a timely filing 
requirement. ''82 
If, by "a timely filing requirement," the majority 
meant a terminal date the same as the section 6072 filing 
date,83 the statement is correct but beside the point since 
the 1990 regulation does not use the section 6072 filing 
date as the terminal date. If instead the majority meant 
that the prior cases rejected any terminal date or event, 
the majority immediately contradicted itself. The major-
ity attached a footnote to the sentence quoted above. The 
footnote reads: 
The relevant meaning that we distill from the 
referenced cases of the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit and the Board is twofold. First, a 
foreign corporation must file a tax return in order to 
deduct its expenses. Second, the Commissioner's 
preparation of a substitute return for the corpora-
tion is generally considered to be the corporation's 
return for Federal income tax purposes and divests 
the taxpayer of its entitlement to file a .return for 
itself.84 
The majority's footnote contradicts its "no timing 
rule" view: The SFR "rule"85 is a timing rule. The 
majority is saying that the corporation can file its own 
return (and claim any deductions) until the date the IRS 
prepares an SFR. After that date, the corroration can no 
longer file its own return (and so loses its deductions). A 
timing requirement remains a timing requirement re-
gardless of whether its terminal date is expressed by (1) 
year, mo111th, or day; or (2) the date of the occurrence of 
some measuring event.s6 
III. Treasury, Not the Courts, Should Draw the Line 
Based on the prior case law, the question no longer is 
"Is there a terminal date or event?" The cases say that 
there is. The questions now are "What s·hould that date 
be?" and "Who -Treasury or the courts - should select 
that date?" It is to those questions that we now turn. 
The relevant questions entail line-drawing. Below, I 
argue first that there was room for Treasury to draw the 
timing line in 1990 since the line had not previously been 
82126 T.C. at 137; see also id. at 98 (referring to "the consistent 
interpretation of the relevant text by the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit and the Board not to include any timely filing 
requirement") and 123-124 ("The Court in Espinosa did not limit 
Anglo-Am. Direct Tea Trading Co., Ltd. to that observation or to 
any other point."). 83Judge Halpern correctly noted in dissent that the majority's 
use of the term "timely" is confusing. Id. at 158. 
84Id. at 137 n.22; see also id. at 142-143. 
85It would be too strong to say the prior cases fixed the 
timing requirement at the date the SFR is prepared. The cases 
suggest other possibilities as well without definitely selecting 
among the various possibilities. See Part III.A. 
• 
• 
86For example, the duration of an automobile warranty could 
be phrased as "for 50,000 miles or one year from the date of • 
purchase, whichever comes first." That language imposes a time 
limit on the warranty, whether measured by event or date. 
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drawn definitively and second that drawing lines con-
cerning the timing of return filing is appropriately an 
administrative, not a judicial, matter anyway . 
A. Absence of Definitive Prior Rule 
If Congress had provided clear instructions on where 
to draw the line regarding time of return filing, the sole 
task would be to implement those instructions. But 
Congress did not provide those instructions, either in the 
statutory text or in legislative history. In that respect, our 
situation is similar to that in the Fulman case in which the 
Supreme Court remarked, in the process of upholding a 
tax regulation: "While obviously some rule ... must be 
applied, Congress ... failed expressly to provide one."87 
That leaves drawing the line to Treasury since, as 
shown in Part 111.B, Treasury is the "gap filler" in our tax 
system. However, it was not until 1990 - more than 60 
years after the first iteration of what is now section 882 -
that Treasury responded via regulations to the statutory 
gap regarding time cutoff. 
In the intervening decades, had the courts filled the 
gap by developing a timing rule? Based on the case law 
review in Part II, the answer is no. The courts resolved 
the specific controversies before them, but, in doing so, 
developed nothing that could be called a defined and 
settled rule. ss 
As shown in Part !LB, possible terminal dates appear-
ing in the cases ranged from the date SFRs were pre-
pared, to the date of the "doomsday" letter, to the date of 
the deficiency notice, to the dates of the trial court 
pleadings, to the assessment date. Moreover, that already 
moving target might, the cases suggested, be moved a bit 
more by circumstances such as whether the taxpayer 
tried in good faith to file returns earlier; whether, how 
often, and with what intensity the IRS contacted the 
taxpayer about the missing return(s); and whether a 
"reasonable'" time had passed after the IRS contacted the 
taxpayer. The prior cases are studded with flexibility-
driven modifiers like "under the circumstances here 
present"s9 and "without prescribing an absolute and 
rigid rule. "90 
Had there been a settled judicial rule, a Brand X issue 
would have arisen.91 I think the 1990 regulation would be 
upheld under Brand X analysis, but that is a topic for the 
second article. For present purposes, it is enough to note 
that there is no competition here between the regulation 
87Fnlman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 533 (1978). 
88The cases did not "provide guidance of general applicabil-
ity concerning timeliness: [they} merely resolve[d] issues cre-
ated by unique fact patterns on a case-by-case basis. Those 
cases do not unambiguously establish the limits of timeli-
ness .... Timeliness is required, but timeliness is not defined." 
126 T.C. at 160 (Halpern, )., dissenting). 
89 Anglo-Am., 38 B.T.A. at 715. 
90Blenheim, 125 F.2d at 910. 
91 See National Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2700 (2005) (holding that "[a] court's prior 
judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court 
decision holds that its construction follows from the unambigu-
ous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency· 
discretion"). 
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and an established judicial rule. The prior cases were too 
variable, flexible, and uncertain to stand for a settled rule. 
B. Administrative, Not Judicial, Prerogative 
When there is a statutory gap to be filled (in this case, 
a line in time to be drawn), the relevant administrative 
agency, not a court, is the appropriate body to perform 
the task. Congress has made that clear in the area of tax 
via section 7805(a),92 and the Supreme Court has made it 
clear in administrative law generally. The Court said in 
Chevron: "The power of an administrative agency to 
administer a congressionally created ... program neces-
sarily requires the formulation of policy and the making 
of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by 
Congress."'n Even as to an implicit delegation, "a court 
may not substitute its own construction ... for a reason-
able interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency. '"i4 
But one need not depend on Chevron to reach that 
result in the Suia/louis context. The Swallows majority 
erected National Miif.flr!r as the controlling standard. Both 
the line of cases of which National Muffler is a part and 
National Muffler itself made it clear that gap-filling and 
line-drawing are up to Treasury and the IRS. In the 
oft-cited Correll case, a forerunner of Natinal Muffler, the 
Supreme Court said: 
Alternatives to the Commissioner's sleep or rest 
rule are of course available. Improvements might 
be imagined. But we do not sit as a committee of 
revision to perfect the administration of the tax 
laws. Congress has delegated to the Commissioner, 
not to the courts, the task of prescribing all needful 
rules and regulations for the enforcement of the 
Internal Revenue Code. In this area of limitless 
factual variations, it is the province of Congress and 
the Commissioner, not the courts, to 1make the 
appropriate adjustments.95 
Numerous other cases of the same line are to the same 
effect.96 So is National Muffler itself. After quoting the 
above language from Correll, National Muffler offered 
reasons for administrative primacy in promulgating sub-
sidiary rules. It "helps ensure that in this area of limitless 
factual variations, like cases will be treated alike. It also 
helps guarantee that the rules will be written by masters 
of the subject, who will be responsible for putting the 
rules into effect. "97 
92Treasury "shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations 
for the enforcement of fthe Code}." Section 7805(a); see, e.g., 
Helvering v. R.J. Rei;nolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114 (1939). 
93Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 
199, 231 (1974)). 
94Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
95United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-307 (1967) (cita-
tions, quotation marks, and footnotes omitted). 
96See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 
U.S. 200, 218-219, Doc 2001-11045, 2001 TNT 75-7 (2001); Com-
missioner v. Portland Ceml'!/'lt Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981); United 
States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973); Bingler v. Johnson, 
394 U.S. 741, 749-751 (1969); Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 
296 (1967). 
97 440 U.S. at 477 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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The Swallozvs majority invoked separation of powers 
concerns. It felt that, through the 1990 regulation, the 
executive branch had infringed on Congress's authority 
to make the laws and on the courts' authority to interpret 
them.98 In my view, separation ,of powers concerns are 
implicated in Swallows, but they cut the other way. The 
real institutional-legitimacy problem in Swallows is that 
the Tax Court insufficiently honored the role of the 
agency in drawing lines under and filling gaps in the 
statute. As Judge Holmes said in dissent, the approach of 
the Swallows majority: 
simply doesn't reflect the contemporary under-
standing of administrative law that regulations are 
a way to make policy choices, not just a way to 
interpret ambiguous statutory phrases ... [There 
are] different competencies of judges and regula-
tion writers. Regulation writers are doing their jobs 
when they make up safe harbors and lay down 
deadlines; for judges to do so - instead of setting 
up fact-bound tests of "reasonableness" - looks 
like an exercise of legislative or administrative, 
rather than judicial, power.99 
C. Summary 
The prior cases established that a time limitation is 
implicit in section 882(c)(2). Congress did not instruct 
where to draw the line regarding timing and the courts 
established no settled rule regarding timing. Line-
drawing and gap-filling are, anyway, properly the prov-
ince of Treasury and the IRS. The agencies had the 
authority to promulgate a timing rule in the 1990 regu-
lation. 
IV. The Regulation's Timing Rule Is Reasonable 
Treasury has the authority to fill in gaps in the code, 
but of course that authority is not unbridled. 100 Thus, we 
need to consider the contents of the 1990 regulation to 
ascertain whether Treasury exercised its line-drawing 
authority reasonably. For two reasons, I believe that it 
did. The regulation (1) effectively furthers the statutory 
purpose and (2) does not impose unreasonable burdens 
on taxpayers. 
A. Statutory Purpose 
It is common in statutory interpretation to favor the 
approach that best advances the purposes of the stat-
ute.101 As shown below, the purpose of section 882(c)(2) is 
to motivate foreign corporations to file returns, and the 
98See 126 T.C. at 147-148. 
99Id. at 17 4. 
10
°The Swallows majority properly stated: "The authority 
delegated to the Secretary, however, is not limitless and, if 
exercised improperly, may usurp the role of Congress as the 
legislator in our system of Government." Id. at 129. 101See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1985 (2006); 
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-204 (1979); Church 
of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463-465 (1892); see 
William N. Eskridge Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, 
Legislation and Statuton; Interpretation 228-230 (2d ed. 2006). 
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bright line in the regulation furthers that purpose better 
than would the indefinite timing possibilities suggested 
in cases. 
The relevant statutory purpose is to encourage the 
filing of returns. "The many administrative problems 
inherent in the application of the federal income tax to 
foreign corporations ... prompted Congress to impose 
special conditions on such corporations."102 Given the 
difficulties in gathering information about foreign corpo-
rations and their activities,103 it is particularly important 
that foreign corporations file tax returns. Thus, "Con-
gress conditioned its grant of deductions upon the timely 
filing of true, proper and complete retums."104 "In view 
of such a specific prerequisite [in the statute} it is incon-
ceivable that Congress contemplated ... that taxpayers 
could wait indefinitely to file returns and [still be allowed 
to claim deductions]."tos 
The 1990 regulation advances that purpose via the 
certainty resulting from a bright line. Under the regula-
tion, foreign corporations know that they will forfeit their 
ability to claim deductions if their returns ar~ more than 
18 months late. The rule is clear, definite, and under-
standable, 106 which should induce the desired behavior. 
In contrast, as described in Part III.A, the prior cases 
"prescrib[ed] [no] absolute and rigid rule."107 That meant 
that taxpayers could adopt a "wait and see" approach, 
hoping that their returns could be omitted entirely or, at 
least, be filed much later, without putting deductions at 
hazard. So (1) perhaps the IRS would never get around to 
preparing an SFR at all. (2) Even if the IRS did, it typically 
contacts the taxpayer before preparing an SFRW8 The 
foreign corporation could wait until this contact, then file 
the returns, preserving its deductions. (3) Even if the 
returns were filed after the SFR was prepared, the 
taxpayer might have reason to hope that the reviewing 
court would select one of the other later terminal events 
mentioned in the case law, such as issuance of the notice 
of deficiency or making of the assessment. 
Section 882(c)(2) was intended to motivate return 
filing via its in terrorem effect.109 The bright-line approach 
of the regulation furthers that purpose. In contrast, the 
indefinite nature of the prior cases encourages a "little to 
lose by waiting" attitude on the part of foreign corpora-
tions. This would lead to what judges of prior cases 
102Blenheim, supra note 29, 125 F.2d at 909. 
103The techniques available to the IRS to gather information 
abroad are described in David M. Richardson, Jerome Borison, 
and Steve Jolmson, Civil Tax Procedure 101-102 (2005). 
104Blenheim, supra note 29, 125 F.2d at 909; see also 126 T.C. at 
182 (Holmes,)., dissenting) (section 882(c)(2) was "unambigu-
ously aimed at giving foreign corporations a major incentive to 
file their returns"). 
105Taylor Securities, supra note 29, at 703-704. 
106
"The 18-month grace period might be shorter or longer 
than the old judicially constructed one. It is rmdeniably more 
definite." 126 T.C. at 162 (Holmes, )., dissenting). 
107Blenheim, supra note 29, 125 F.2d at 910. 
'
08See !RM 5.1.10.3.2 and 5.1.11.6.5. Regarding SFRs gener-
ally, see reg. section 301.6020-lT. 
109Espinosa, supra note 27, at 157. 
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feared: "[putting] a premium on evasion." 110 Thus, the 
content of the regulation is reasonable because its clear 
rule better advances the congressional purpose . 
The use of bright lines to further return filing and 
accommodate administrative realities is well known in 
our tax system. In a case involving the delinquency 
penalty, the Supreme Court chose a bright-line approach, 
saying: 
Deadlines are inherently arbitrary; fixed dates, 
however, are often essential to accomplish neces-
sary results. The Government has millions of tax-
payers to monitor, and our system of self-
assessment in the initial calculation of a tax simply 
cannot work on any basis other than one of strict 
filing standards. Any less rigid standard would risk 
encouraging a lax attitude toward filing dates. 
Prompt payment of taxes is imperative to the 
Government, which should not have to assume the 
burden of unnecessary ad hoc determinations. 111 
B. No Unreasonable Burden 
The viability of the 1990 regulation will turn mainly on 
its consistency with the statute, not on its effect on 
taxpayers. Nonetheless, in an inquiry as open-ended as 
reasonableness, little is out of bounds. Moreover, as 
Ardbern reminds us, 112 as long as human beings decide 
cases, perceived equities will always be relevant atmos-
pherically, whether or not they're relevant doctrinally. 
In that context, it is worth noting that the 1990 
regulation neither traduces taxpayer reliance interests 
nor imposes hardships on taxpayers. 113 This is so for 
three reasons. First, taxpayers had notice 6f the regula-
tion and time to adjust to it. The regulation was initially 
released in proposed form in July 1989.114 After notice 
and comment, the final regulation was made effective for 
tax years ending after July 31, 1990.115 Because income tax 
return filing is on an annual basis, all foreign corpora-
tions doing business in the United States had the oppor-
tunity to accommodate their filing practices to the rules 
set forth in the regulation. Certainly that was true of the 
Swallows taxpayer, since the promulgation of the regula-
tion preceded by several years the first tax year at issue in 
the case.u6 
Second, the terminal date under the regulation gener-
ally is 18 months after the due date of the foreign 
corporation's return for the tax year. Third, the regulation 
llOTaylor Securities, supra note 29, 40 B.T.A. at 703-704; see also 
Espinosa, supra note 27, at 157-158. 
rnunited States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249 (1985). 
112See Ardbern, supra note 29, 120 F.2d at 426, discussed at text 
accompanying notes 56-57 supra. 
113Cf Anderson, Clayton Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d 972, 981 
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978); I.esavoy Founda-
tion v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 589, 591-594 (3d Cir. 1956) (reliance 
and burden are among relevant factors in deciding whether a 
retroactive IRS revocation of a taxpayer-specific ruling is an 
abuse of discretion). 
rn54 Fed. Reg. 31547 Uuly 31, 1989). 
115T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172; 55 Fed. Reg. 50827 (Dec. 11, 
1990). 
116126 T.C. at 138; see text accompanying note 157 infra. 
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has an answer to the unusual instances in which that 
18-month period may not be enough. The 1990 version of 
the regulation provided that the time limitation "may be 
waived by the [IRS] in rare and unusual circumstances if 
good cause for such waiver ... is established by the 
foreign corporation."117 The waiver provision was re-
vised, in 2002 and 2003 amendments, to apply if the 
corporation "establishes to the satisfaction of the [IRS] 
that the corporation ... acted reasonably and in good 
faith in failing to file a U.S. income tax return." 118 
C. Summary 
In Atlantic Mutual, the Supreme Court upheld another 
interpretive tax regulation that the Tax Court had 
thought invalid. The Court rejected the taxpayer's "plain 
meaning of the statute" argument, 11 9 and it approved the 
regulation because "the interpretation adopted by 
the ... Regulation seems to us a reasonable accommoda-
tion - and one that the statute very likely intended - of 
the competing interests of fairness, administrability, and 
avoidance of abuse." 12° 
A similar characterization, I believe, applies to the 
regulation at issue in Swallozvs. The regulation's bright-
line terminal date promotes Congress's purpose in enact-
ing section 882(c)(2) and responds to a genuine need in 
sound administration of the income tax regarding foreign 
corporations. Also, taxpayers are not unduly burdened 
by the regulation since they had notice of it, it was 
prospective in application, it grants a 11h-year grace 
period, and it provides for waiver of the terminal date in 
proper cases. The 1990 regulation is reasonable in sub-
stance. 
V. Restoring National Muffler Deference 
Invalidating a regulation is serious business because. 
rather than affecting merely one taxpayer for one year, it 
affects a whole class of taxpayers for potentially many 
years. But the stakes in Swallows are even higher. The 
Swallows majority distorted the National Muffler standard. 
If its approach metastasizes to other cases, the original 
deferential nature of that standard could be compro-
mised. 
National Muffler is part of a line of cases that is specific 
to tax regulations and rulings, a line that originated 
before, has continued after, and exists in unclear relation-
ship to Chevron. 121 Below, we first examine the deferential 
character of the line of cases generally. Then, we consider 
National Muffler specifically, including its animating 
spirit, general test, and specific considerations. 
n?Former reg. section l.882-4(a)(3)(ii). 
118Reg. section l.882-4(a)(3)(ii). 
119 Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, 387-389, 
Doc 98-12876, 98 TNT 77-8 (1998). 
120/d. at 390-391. 
121See generally Paul L. Caron, "Tax Myopia Meets Tax 
Hyperopia: The Unproven Case of Increased Judicial Deference 
to Revenue Rulings," 57 Ohio St. L.J. 637, 654-669 (1996); ABA 
Deference Report, supra note 50, at 759-777 . 
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A. Line of Cases Generally 
The spirit in which a court applies a standard can be as 
important as, or more important than, the linguistic 
formulation of that standard. 122 The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly taught that the tax-specific line of authority of 
which National Muffler is a part is deferential. 
In one frequently cited case, the Court said: "This 
Court has many times declared that Treasury regulations 
must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly incon-
sistent with the revenue statutes."123 Tax regulations will 
be upheld as long as they "implement the congressional 
mandate in some reasonable manner."124 Moreover, even 
if the regulation is interpretive, not legislative, "we must 
still treat the regulation with deference."12s 
The Court's actual behavior in these cases corresponds 
to its rhetoric of deference. In numerous cases of this line, 
the Supreme Court reversed circuit court decisions in-
validating regulations or subregulation IRS positions.126 
In far fewer cases did the Supreme Court strike down 
a regulation, and those cases typically involved consid-
erations not present in Swallows. For example, in Vogel 
Fertilizer and Rowan there were congressional committee 
reports adverse to the regulation;127 no such reports are 
adverse to the Swallows regulation.128 The problem with 
the regulation at issue in R.J. Reynolds was its retroactiv-
122For example, the Skidmore standard can result in deference 
ranging from 'great' to 'some' to 'little' depending on its 
application. ABA Deference Report, supra note 50, at 751; see 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-140 (1944). Similarly, 
Cl1evron can be either indulgent or restrictive depending on how 
its steps are applied. See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, "Court Review 
of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era," 64 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 35, 39-40 (1995); Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of 
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council (3d rev. draft), at 2-3, 
prepared for the_Scope of Judicial Revision portion of the Project 
on the Administrative Procedure Act (June 2001), available at 
http:/ /www.abanet.org/ adminlaw I apa/ chevron_revised_3.doc 
(last visited on June 22, 2006); Irving Salem and Richard Bress, 
"Agency Deference Under the Judicial Microscope of the Su-
preme Court," Tax Notes, Sept. 4, 2000, p. 1257. 
1221Comn1issioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 
(1948) (emphasis added). 
124Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169 
(1981); United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973); United 
States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967) (emphasis added). 
125Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 448, Doc 2003-5648, 
2003 TNT 43-7 (2003). 
126See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 
U.S. 200 (2001); Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156 
(1981); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 (1978) (resolving 
circuit split); Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969); United States 
v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967); Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber 
Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938); 
United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U.S. 459 (1933) 
(resolving circuit split); cf. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 
(1985) (same in a tax case citing Chevron). 
127United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 26-31 (1982); 
Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 255-258 (1981). 
128The Swallows majority's best (but insufficient) attempt to 
identify a committee report favorable to its position was a "cf." 
to a 1996 report under section 874 to the effect that losing their 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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ity; 12':! the Su)allows regulation was prospective.130 In 
Cartwright, the tax regulation for valuing securities was 
"manifestly inconsistent with the most elementary pro-
visions of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and 
operate[d] without regard to the market in mutual fund 
s}:lares that the Act created and regulates."131 The Swal-
lows regulation does not clash with any nontax rule of 
law. 
The situation in the lower federal courts defies neat 
categorization. 132 It is worth noting that the Tax Court's 
decisions have often been reversed when they have 
found "regulations unreasonable after the extensive re-
view of the sort [it engaged in in Swallows]."133 Swallows 
should be added to this regrettable roll. 
Thus, the Supreme Court has made clear by word and 
deed that the line of authority of which National Muffler is 
a part is congenial, not hostile, to upholding Treasury 
regulations. 1 ~4 That spirit should be borne in mind by 
courts applying National Muffler. 
B. National Muffler 
The Swallows majority maintained that the 1990 regu-
lation failed under National Muffler because the timing 
limitation "is inconsistent with the plain meaning of [the] 
statute. " 135 It then analyzed six specific considerations 
that had been mentioned in National Muffler: 
(1) Whether the regulation is a substantially con-
temporaneous construction of the sta~ute by those 
presumed to have been aware of congressional 
intent; (2) the manner in which a regulation dating 
from a later period evolved; (3) the length of time 
that the,regulation has been in effect; (4) the reliance 
placed upon the regulation; (5) the consistency of 
the Secretary's interpretation; and (6) the degree of 
scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation 
during subsequent reenactments of the statute. 136 
Contemporaneity: The majority noted that the regula-
tion was promulgated 62 years after the original version 
of section 882(c)(2) was enacted (and 72 years after the 
deductions "may result in quite heavy tax burdens" for non-
resident alien individuals. 126 T.C. at 136 n.21 (quoting S. Rep. 
1707, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-77 (1966), reprinted at 1966-2 C.B. 
1059, 1076-1077). 
129Helvering v. R.]. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 116-117 
(1939). 
130T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172, 172. 
131 Uniled States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 557 (1973). 
132See generally ABA Deference Report, supra note 50, at 
763-776. 
133Swallows, 126 T.C. at 162 n.2 (Ho!rnes, )., dissenting) (citing 
numerous cases in which the Tax Court was reversed on app~al 
after invalidating a regulation). 
134Indeed, it may be that Chevron - which usually is 
considered deferential, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 
2208, 2235-2236 (2006) (Roberts, C.j., concurring) (describing 
Chevron as a "generous" standard) - is less deferential regard-
ing tax regulations than is the tax-specific line of cases. See Ellen 
P. Aprill, "Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regula-
tions," 3 Fla. Tax. Rev. 51, 52 (1996). 
135126 T.C. at 132; see also id. at 132-136. 
136Jd. at 136-137 (citing 440 U.S. at 477). 
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original version of substantially similar section 874(a)) 
and so was not a substantially contemporaneous con-
struction.137 
Manner of evolution: The majority offered four points 
adverse to the regulation on this score. (1) The regulation 
was issued after the Fourth Circuit and the BIA "had 
repeatedly and consistently held that the relevant text did 
not include a timely filing requirement. "138 (2) The regu-
lation was issued after multiple reenactments of the 
statute, "none of which altered the judiciary's construc-
tion of the text."139 (3) The regulations "merely adopted 
[the IRS's] unsuccessful litigating position."140 (4) Com-
mentators had objected to a time limitation in the regu-
lation.141 
Tenure: The majority noted that the 1990 regulation 
"had only been in effect for approximately three years as 
of the first year in issue."142 
Reliance: "Petitioner obviously did not rely upon the 
disputed regulations when it filed the subject returns 
untimely. In fact, the record before us persuades us that 
petitioner filed those returns relying on the belief that it 
would be [able to claim its deductions]."143 
Consistency: The 1957 regulations had not contained a 
timing limitation.144 
Congressional scrutiny: "Section 882(c)(2) has not been 
amended since the issuance of the disputed regula-
tion."t4s 
In my view, the Swallows majority's treatment of 
National Muffler is deficient. It is wrong regarding many 
particulars, especially those that are most important. 
More seriously, it misperceives the role of the particulars 
in the overall analysis and it effectively converts National 
Muffler from a deferential standard into a hard-look 
standard. 
1. Particulars. The six considerations mentioned in Na-
tional Muffler were never intended to be applied in a 
wooden, "checklist" manner, as the Supreme Court made 
clear in the case itself. From that perspective, reconsider 
the Swallows majority's analysis. 
Contemporaneity: The Swallows majority was right that 
the 1990 regulation is not a contemporaneous construc-
tion of the statute, but that means little. The taxpayer in 
National Muffler made the same argument, but the Su-
preme Court upheld the challenged regulation nonethe-
less. The Court remarked: "Contemporaneity, however, is 
only one of many considerations that counsel courts to 
defer to the administrative interpretation of a statute. It 
need not control here."146 
Manner of evolution: All four of the Swallows majority's 
points in this regard are wrong or irrelevant. The prior 
137126 T.C at 137. 
13sid. 
139Id. 
I40Id. 
141Id.; see also id. at 127-128. 
142Id. at 138. 
143Id. 
144[d. 
14sid. 
146440 U.S. at 485. 
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cases had, in fact, rejected a "timely filing requirement,'' 
but the regulation does not require that the return be filed 
on time, only that it be filed not later than 18 months after 
it would have been timely. 
The IRS won most of the prior cases, which makes talk 
of an "unsuccessful litigating position" sound strange. 
Moreover, the 18-month grace period in the regulation is 
considerably more indulgent than - and so does not 
merely repeat - the position the IRS started with in 
Anglo-American. And, of course, a regulation has more 
weight than a mere litigating position, even if their 
contents are identical. 
I acknowledge that the views of commentators have 
some significance. (At least, as a matter of my own 
self-interest, I hope that is true.) However, the views of 
courts are more significant. As detailed in Part II above, 
the prior cases firmly established that some timing ele-
ment is implicit in the statute. As detailed in Part III and 
Part IV, it was Treasury's job to define that time element 
and the 1990 regulation did so responsibly. 147 
That leaves only the Swallows majority's legislative 
reenactment argument. The majority observed that none 
of the reenactments altered the prior cases.148 However, 
the majority presented no solid evidence that Congress 
was even aware of the prior cases when it was engaged in 
the reenacting.149 The majority appeared to suggest that a 
demonstration of aero.al congressional awareness and 
approval is unnecessary because it can be "assume[d]" 
that Congress knows the law.150 However, "though 
courts have stated this general proposition ... no case has 
rested on this presumption alone as a basis for holding 
that the statute required [a particular] interpretation."151 
It is reasonable to assume that Congress is aware of major 
Supreme Court cases and of other cases that have become 
famous or notorious. It severely tests credulity, however, 
to assume that Congress is aware of all lower court 
decisions in highly technical nooks and crannies of the 
law. That being the case, I agree with the dissenters that 
the reenactment argument should not have been used at 
a11.1s2 
However, were that argument admissible, it would 
undercut, not support, the majority's National Muffler 
analysis. The 1928 statute was reenacted in 1932, 1934, 
1936, 1938, 1939, 1954, 1966, and 1986.153 The 1932, 1934, 
1936, and 1938 reenactments shed no light on our issue 
147Treasury explained thusly its rejection of the commenta-
tors' objection. The terminal date was retained in the final 
regulation "since the statute clearly provides for the denial of 
deductions ... if returns are not filed in a timely manner. This 
requirement is justified because of different administrative and 
compliance concerns with regard to nonresident alien individu-
als and foreign corporations." T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172, 172. 
148126 T.C at 137. 
149See id. at 140-142. 
150Id. at 139 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 
677, 696-697 (1979)). ' 
15
'AFL-CIO v. Brock, 835 F.2d 912, 916 n.6 (D.C Cir. 1987) 
(em~hasis in original). 
1 2See Part LC supra. 
153See 126 TC at 107-109. 
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since they preceded the Anglo-American decision.1s4 The 
1939 reenactment occurred about four months after 
Anglo-American.155 However, the 1939 legislation was the 
first codification of the formerly separate session laws 
that related to federal taxes. During those four months, it 
is doubtful that Congress - engaged in the great labor of 
initial codification of all the tax laws - learned of, 
carefully pondered, and decided that it agreed with the 
Anglo-American decision. Certainly, there is little evidence 
that it did. 
Whatever minimal support the Swallows majority 
could gain from the 1939 reenactment would be more 
than overcome by the 1954, 1966, and 1986 reenactments. 
In 1939 through 1942, the BTA and the Fourth Circuit 
decided Taylor Securities, Ardbern, Blenheim, and Georday, 
which, as shown in Part 11.B, established that a time 
limitation is implicit in the statute. If, in 1954, 1966, and 
1986, Congress was approving anything, it was approv-
ing the then-current state of the law, which was defined 
by those post-Anglo-American cases. 
On those facts, the 1954, 1966, and 1986 reenactments 
would be better evidence of Congress's intent than 
would the 1939 reenactment. Therefore, if (contrary to my 
view) the reenactment doctrine has any role to play in 
Swallows at all, that doctrine undermines, rather than 
supports, the Swallows holding. 
Tenure: The majority stated that the regulation was 
promulgated about three years before the first tax year at 
issue in Swallows.156 That computation might be chal-
lenged, 157 but there is no need to quibble. Three years is 
more than enough to put a taxpayer on notice. Moreover, 
of course, many regulations are challenged relatively 
early in their lives, and courts have often upheld regula-
tions promulgated only a few years before the first tax 
year at issue.158 
Reliance: It would be strange to say that a reason the 
regulation should not receive deference is that the tax-
payer challenging a regulation did not rely on the regu-
154Anglo-American was decided on Oct. 4, 1938. The 1938 
reenactment was on May 28, 1938. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 
52 Stat. 447, 531. 155The 1939 legislation was approved on Feb. 10, 1939. 
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 1, 79, 510. Mills (decided 
on Oct. 5, 1938) also preceded the 1939 legislation by slightly 
more than four months. However, as a BTA memorandum 
decision, Mills is even less likely than Anglo-American to have 
garnered congressional attention and approval. The other early 
BIA memorandum decision, American Investment, was decided 
on Apr. 13, 1939, after the 1939 legislation. 
15 126 T.C. at 138. 
157The majority's three-year calculation presumably reflects 
the span between the finalization of the regulation in December 
1990 and the June 1, 1993, start of the taxpayer's 1994 fiscal year. 
Beginning the span instead with the July 1989 date the regula-
tion was initially proposed or ending the span with the expira-
tion of the 18-month grace period would produce a spread 
considerably longer than three years. Of course, the spreads are 
lonrser yet for the other years at issue in Szvallows, 1995 and 1996. 
8See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2003) 
(regulation promulgated in 1977; first tax year at issue: 1979); 
Fm:vcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375 (1931) (regulation 
promulgated in April 1919; first tax year at issue: 1919). 
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lation. That position would encourage noncompliance 
and presumably would put an adverse "thumb on the 
scale" in all or most cases in which regulations are 
challenged. Surely that's not what the Supreme Court 
was trying to do in National Muffler. 
Consistency: As a litigating position, the IRS consis-
tently argued that what is now section 882(c)(2) author-
izes a timing limitation although its position changed as 
to what the terminal date of that limitation is.159 After it 
lost in Anglo-American, the IRS published a nonacquies-
cence to the case160 and it continued litigating later cases. 
The 1957 regulation did not set out a time limit. 
Neither, however, did it affirmatively state that deduc-
tions could be claimed, regardless of how late the return 
was filed. 161 In any event, a change of regulatory sub-
stance is not a doctrinal kiss of death. National Muffler 
itself upheld a challenged regulation even though the 
regulation constituted an administrative shift. In that 
case, the Supreme Court said: "We would be reluctant to 
adopt the rigid view that an agency may not alter its 
interpretation in light of administrative experience."162 
The Court has said the same in many other cases, both 
before163 and after164 National Muffler. "An initial agency 
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the 
contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, 
must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of 
its policy on a continuing basis."165 
Congressional scrutiny: Section 882(c)(2) has not been 
amended since 1990, so Congress has neither endorsed 
nor repudiated the 1990 regulation. This is a nonfactor. 
2. Overall analysis. As shown above, I believe that the six 
considerations listed in National Muffler support, rather 
than undercut, the validity of the regulation at issue in 
Swallows. While discussing those considerations, how-
ever, we need to resist myopia. Those considerations are 
not independent. Instead they are intended to illuminate 
the ultimate inquiry, which is whether the regulation 
harmonizes with the language, origin, and purpose of the 
statute.166 Based on Parts II, III, and N of this article, I 
believe that the 1990 regulation comfortably passes mus-
ter under that ultimate inquiry. 
The Swallows majority appears to have lost sight of the 
spirit behind that inquiry. The portion of National Muffler 
that the majority quoted is bracketed by deferential 
language that the majority passed over. Before the quoted 
language is a strong reaffirmation that Congress del-
egated the authority to prescribe needed rules to Treas-
ury, not the courts, and that regulations should be upheld 
159See 126 T.C. at 154 (Swift, )., dissenting). 
1601939-1 C.B. (pt. 1) 39. 
161 See former reg. section 1.882-4, 22 Fed. Reg. 8362 (Oct. 23, 
1957). 162440 U.S. at 485. The cases described in Part II.B explain 
why "administrative experience" made clear the need for a 
hmin_?," rule. See, e.g., Blenheim Co., supra note 29, 125 F.2d at 910. 
16 E.g., Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 101 (1939). 
164£.g., National Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699-2700 (2005). 
165Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863. 166440 U.S. at 477. 
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if they implement the statute "in some reasonable man-
ner."167 Near the end of National Muffler, the Supreme 
Court again instructed that: "The choice among reason-
able interpretations is for the Commissioner, not the 
courts. " 168 
The Swallows majority viewed the six considerations 
through the wrong lens. One can view those consider-
ations as either subtractive or additive in nature. Under a 
subtractive approach, the absence or failure of one or 
some considerations would decrease the level of defer-
ence accorded, or strip away deference entirely, or even 
constitute reason to reject the position taken in the 
regulation. In contrast, under an additive approach, the 
absence or failure of some considerations would not 
lessen deference; instead, their presence or satisfaction 
would cause even extra deference, "super deference," to 
be accorded to the regulation. The subtractive approach 
is "starts high but can go low (or even negative)," while 
the additive approach is "starts high and can go even 
higher." 
The Swallows majority used the six considerations 
subtractively. While examples of both subtractive and 
additive use can be found in the numerous cases apply-
ing National Muffler, I believe that the additive approach 
better reflects the Supreme Court's deferential approach 
in that case. 
The National Muffler Court followed the enumeration 
of the considerations with citation to two cases - South 
Texas Lumber and Win1nill 169 - and indeed most of the six 
considerations are explored or mentioned in one or both 
of those cases. Significantly, both of the cited cases 
upheld the regulations there at issue. They 'used such of 
those considerations as were present as support for the 
regulations' validity. 
I see Natiqnal Muffler as similar in this spirit to the 
Supreme CoU:rt's Dixon decision,170 which in another tax 
context clearly chose the additive over the subtractive 
approach. In Dixon, the taxpayer argued that the IRS had 
abused its discretion in giving retroactive effect to its 
withdrawal of an acquiescence to a prior case. As part of 
his argument, the taxpayer looked to an earlier case, 
Automobil' Club of Michigan, 171 in which the Court had 
upheld another retroactive IRS decision. 
The Dixon taxpayer argued that considerations men-
tioned in Automobile Club of Michigan were not present in 
Dixon, so that Dixon should reach a different result. That 
was a subtractive argument, and the Dixon Court rejected 
it. 
Although we mentioned certain facts in support of 
our conclusion in Automobile Club that there had not 
been an abuse of discretion in that case, it does not 
follow that the absence of one or more of these facts 
167Id. at 476-477 (citing many cases). 168/d. at 488. 
169/d. at 477 (citing Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 
U.S. 496, 501 (1948); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938)). 
170Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965). 
171Automobile Club of Michigan v. Co1nmissioner, 353 U.S. 180 
(1957). 
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in another case wherein a ruling or regulation is 
applied retroactively establishes an abuse of discre-
tion.172 
Dixon's approach to the abuse of discretion consider-
ations should also be the approach taken regarding the 
National Muffler considerations. An additive approach 
according extra deference when some conditions are 
present better fits the deferential spirit of National Muffler 
than does a subtractive approach. 
When its guiding spirit is ignored, National Muffler is 
distorted. No longer a shield protecting regulations when 
fairly possible under the governing statute, National 
Muffler becomes a sword to cut down regulations when 
judges dislike their content. The majority's approach is 
not deference. It is a hard-look approach.173 Reversing 
Swallows would restore National Muffler, and the line of 
which it is a part, to their proper role. 
VI. Conclusion 
The result reached in Stuallows could be reversed on 
Chevron or Brand X grounds, as the dissents maintained174 
and as I will argue in the second report. However, the 
Third Circuit has yet to apply Chevron to interpretive tax 
regulations, 17" and judges sometimes prefer to resolve 
cases on the narrowest or least ambitious ground avail-
able.17'' Accordingly, this report has shown that Swallows 
can and should be reversed even on the basis of National 
Muffler, the standard that the Swallows majority pur-
ported to apply. 
172381 U.S. at 76. 
173See 126 T.C. at 174 (Holmes, J., dissenting). As to the "hard 
look" doctrine generally, see Merrick Garland, '"Deregulation 
and judicial Review," 98 Harv. L. Rev. 505, 525-527, 554 (1985). 
174/d. at 149-150 (judge Swift), 157-162 Uudge Halpern), and 
171-182 (judge Holmes). 175The key Third Circuit case thus far is E.I. du Pont de 
Nen1ours & Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.3d 130, 135· 136, and n.23, 
Doc 94-10819, 94 TNT 240-6 (1994), which considered but did not 
decide whether Chevron applies to interpretive tax regulations. 
In Clean; v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 807 (1999), a nontax case, the 
Third Circuit held that Chevron applies to regulations promul-
gated through the familiar notice-and-comment process. See 5 
U.S.C. section 553(b). Interpretive tax regulations virtually al-
ways go through that process. See proc. reg. section 601.601. 176This approach is typified by recent remarks by Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts Jr.: ''If it is not necessary to decide more 
to dispose of a case, in my view it is necessary not to decide 
more." E.J. Dionne Jr., "The Chief Justice Sets a Standard," The 
Washington Post, June 20, 2006, at A17 (quoting Chief Justice 
Roberts's May 21, 2006, speech to the graduating class of 
Georgetown University School of Law); see also David Pannick, 
Q.C., "I Used to Be a Judge but I'm All Right Now," The Times 
(London), June 6, 2006, at 5 (''a wise judge never decides more 
than is necessary to dispose of the case"). 
A fairly recent example in tax is the Supreme Court's 
decision in Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40, 58-59, Doc 
2005-4642, 2005 TNT 44-12 (2004). The Court largely avoided 
meaty statutory and constitutional issues by holding narrowly 
that the Tax Court didn't understand what its own rule meant. 
That approach was surprising given the high level of deference 
traditionally accorded to courts' and agencies' constructions of 
their own rules. See id. at 68-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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Most arguments in and based on Swallows can be 
winnowed down to three key pojnts, which, in my 
opinion, make the case for reversal quite strong. 
(1) Every tribunal - the BTA. the Tax Court, and the 
Fourth Circuit - that previously }'Onsidered the question 
held that some timing requirement regarding the filing of 
returns is implied by the governing statute. Therefore, 
the only question is line-drawing: where to draw the line 
behveen permissible and impermissible tardiness. 
(2) Since neither the statute itself nor its legislative 
history addresses where to draw the line, Congress left a 
gap to .be filled. Line-drawing under an explicit or 
implicit delegation is a job for an administrative agency, 
not for a court. The Supreme Court has taught this 
regarding administrative law generally, and section 
7805(a) confirms it regarding tax specifically. 
(3) The bright line drawn by the regulation better 
advances Congress's pwpose than di d the uncertain 
timing possibilities suggested by earlier cases. ·me regu-
lation was prospective, and it gives taxpayers an 18-
month period. Deductions are not forfeited simply be-
cause a return is filed after its due date. They are lost only 
if the return is filed more than ns years after the due 
366 
date, and even this time limit can be waived in appro-
priate sjtuations. Allowing a Ph-year period is hardly 
· draconian, excessively burdensome, or unreasonable. .. 
Those three points being so, it is hard to see the 9 ' 
regulation being invalidated under any standard that 
genuinely can be called deference, whether it be National 
Muffler, Cltevron, or anything else. In dissent, Judge , 
Holmes wrote: "Upholding this regulation should be 
almost trivially easy."177 He was, and is, right. 
177126 T.C. at 162. 
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